Belarus: The Post Soviet-Soviet Republic
Why the Belarus saga consumes so much air time and headspace in the minds of Europeans and the American geopolitical establishment.
Introduction:
Belarus, like North Korea, never became a truly de-Sovietized state after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. But what separates North Korea from Belarus is that Belarus had one free and open election in 1994, which defied the norm for all the other Post-Soviet Republics. While the Polish, Baltics, Romania, and Hungary voted in nationalist governments, Belarus elected the former head of a collective farm who promised to enshrine the Belarusian Soviet system. This man’s name was Aleksander Lukashenko, the first and only President of Belarus.
In this article, I will seek to explain how Belarus has maintained its status as the only Post-Soviet-Soviet Republic, the story of Lukashenko, and how the 2020 Presidential election has pushed the continent’s times capsule deeper into the arms of the Russians.
The 1994 Election: Choosing Happier Days
Aleksander Lukashenko, the former head of a collective farm, tossed in his hat in the ring among seven other candidates for the first Presidential election of the new Belarusian Republic. He ran on a populist platform that focused on eliminating corruption in the civil service, removing members of the communist party from parliament, and increases relations with the Russian Federation, a nation Belarus shares a deep cultural, economic, and historical affinity with.
Lukashenko shocked the countries establishment by winning the first round of the election with 44.8% of the vote, with the current Prime Minister, Viačasłaŭ Kiebič, receiving 17.3%. In the second round, Lukashenko would take a further 80.1%, with Kiebic only receiving 19.9%, with 70% of the eligible voting population turning out to vote.
In his first term, Lukashenko would further consolidate power using his early popularity to get several referenda passed that would dissolve the parliament filled with Communist Party members which would be replaced by those loyal to him in subsequent elections, and that would see the Supreme Court cleared out and subsequently replaced with those loyal to him. In its first election, Belarus chose to remain squarely in the happy years of the mid-60s-late 70s, where the state was paternal and all providing. Not so much to have lofty expectations that could never be filled but just enough to ensure a level of comfort that left few questions.
The Story of Lukashenko: Europe’s Remaining Strongman
What’s remarkable is how popular the man was until fairly recently, with even western non-partisan polling placing his approval in the upper fifties. At one time, this level of popularity existed across state lines in the newly founded Russian Federation, where President Boris Yeltsin’s popularity was driving off a cliff. The Russian people saw a President in Lukashenko that was accountable, popular and stabilizing his newly liberated Republic. It was only Yeltsin’s desperate gambit to replace himself with Vladimir Putin that thwarted Lukashenko’s nearly successful power grab.
This video by the Caspian Report does a great job of detailing this history. But after Lukashenko’s unsuccessful attempt to annex Russia, he settled back into his role as the President of the last remaining Soviet Republic. Lukashenko realized very quickly that Belarus was at the core of the Russian natural gas pipelines, where he could place excessive tariffs and transit fees on Russian gas exports to Central Europe. Where Lukashenko was smarter than his Ukrainian counterparts was never trying to pull away from the Russian orbit.
Lukashenko rightfully assumed that as long as he remained economically and militarily in the Russian orbit, they would be willing to forgo some profits on their gas exports which Lukashenko could funnel into the various welfare and state-operated enterprises. Ukraine made the mistake of trying to tax Russian gas exports while trying to move into the EU and thus Germany’s sphere of influence.
Lukashenko would use the transit taxes to provide modern healthcare facilities, recreational facilities for state employees, new paved roads and sidewalks, discounted foodstuffs, and government-subsidized housing. These programs were deemed so successful that the level of poverty in Belarus was considerably lower than its other post-soviet counterparts but gave the Nordic countries a run for their money. This is in spite of the lack of substantial post-independence growth that Poland, the Baltics, Romania, Hungry, and Bulgaria all experienced.
But in the past five years, this all began to change with Russia’s growing insecurity and economic crisis spurred by the 2014 seizure of Crimea that would see the Russian Ruble collapse roughly 25-37 Rubles to the dollar to at its peak 79 Rubles to the dollar while the economy returned to pre-2008 levels as Russian industrial and commodity extraction capacity shutdown as they desperately searched for new sources of dollar and euro funding.
This panic at the heights of Russian power began to crack down on the Belarusian transit fee scheme despite being formally in the Russian orbit. It started as ending the discounts on Russian oil and gas exports to Belarus, then suing Belarus for wrongful fee collection, and then finally shutting down all exports of gas to Belarus due to claims of pipeline contamination. The Baltic Nations and Poland, for a time, substituted Russian Oil and Gas exports with their own supplies of American imports of oil and gas they had stored at their own facilities.
It would be this brief period that Belarus made deliberate efforts to reach out to the West and provide some limited reforms in the realm of political rights that would appeal to the European Union. Belarus also concluded a $500 million Belt and Road grant from the Chinese the helped fill Belaruses’ depleted coffers. However, 2020 would see Belarus pulled back into the Russian orbit.
The 2020 Election: The Failure of the West and the Triumph of Russia
The 2020 Belarusian Election was meant to be like every other previous presidential election before it. Lukashenko would run for another term largely unopposed or opposed by a non-viable candidate. The lack of candidates is largely due to Lukashenko’s latent popularity with most of the population as basic and ancillary needs were cared for and provided for by state funds.
2020 would mark a considerable change as not only was Belarus now cash poor but now had a population that was beginning to look for changes. Siarhei Tsikhanouski, a famous Belarusian youtube blogger, would throw his hat in the ring under the banner of his new party, the “Country for Life.” He would be subsequently arrested, and his wife, Sviatlana Tsikanouskaya, would run in his place, receiving the approval to run for president by the Central Election Commission of Belarus.
Her rallies during the campaign season started to attract more and more people as the desire for change stemming from a stagnating economy began to resonate with more people. This is at its core the biggest problem faced by authoritarian states as when the benefits, growth, and prosperity the populace will seek power for themselves with the belief that with them in power, they’ll be able to restore and expand the previous benefits. While this has its own problems, it’s the source of strength behind the rapid rise of Tiskhabouskaya’s candidacy but also her fall.
Lukashenko facing the first true threat to his continued reign as President would start shuttering Tiskhabouskaya’s events and threatening further police action until she fled the country seeking asylum in neighboring Lithuania. The subsequent protests that would break out due to this and Lukashenko winning the election led to considerable Russian intervention through the deployment of troops to the major cities and a massive cash infusion, with the latest tranche being a $500 million loan.
The outcome that resulted came from several factors:
Western Democracies are far to willing to throw there support behind opposition candidates without taking into account the regional politics and the domestic constraints of the government they’re seeking to change.
The EU forced Russia to return to subsidizing Belarus and propping up the Lukashenko government.
The West, in general, has gotten worse in helping authoritarians transition out of power and allowing an elected democracy to take its place. Most of this stems from the hangover of the “victorious democracies” narrative that became pervasive after the collapse of the Soviet union in 91 and the economic take-off of the former Warsaw pack nations. That democracy was the best government system but the one that all nations will eventually transition towards.
While the US has become much warier or regime change wars or operations that see the covert removal of authoritarian regimes, the EU has continued to maintain its stance as a staunch defender of the liberal order. This has become embodied by the recent EU level crackdowns on Poland, Hungry, Slovakia, and in limited instances, Croatia and the opening of coffers to Ukraine.
The most recent blunder involves the heavy enforcement of the opposition campaign in Belarus, calling the government in Belarus illegitimate, and hanging billions of euros in aid to Belarus on the condition of a transition of power. Billions of euro’s that only recently had no stipulations on them outside of moving further away from the Russian orbit.
All in one moment, the EU overplayed its hand enforced a candidate that would never win and pushed a once cash strapped Lukashenko government into the hands of a cash-rich Russian government which dropped all previous opposition to granting gas and oil discount and generous loan offers in exchange for deeper defense and government relations.
Additionally, the EU has long sought the joint expansion of its own borders along with those of NATO, the organization chiefly responsible for European defense. This has seen the integration of most of the Warsaw Pact nations by 2004 and the instigation of domestic unrest in the remaining nations securing the Russian border. Those being Moldova, Ukraine, and Georiga.
In Moldova, a nation that’s saught union in Romania still technically remains at war with Transnistria, a breakaway province that still contains active Russian military forces. Georgia continues to contest the independence of the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which are protected by Russian forces. Then finally, in Ukraine, a pro-EU government continues to actively battle against the breakaway regions of Lugansk and Donetsk, which are secured by Russian paramilitary forces and volunteers.
An article in the NATO charter prevents the ascension of nations who remain at war or still possess domestic instability or insurrections. This article exists to protect NATO nations from being forced to join in conflicts that existed before their accession, which might lead to an escalation and expansion of the pre-existing conflicts. Ironically, all the nations interested in joining NATO are involved in domestic insurrections and instability. Russia desperately tries to prevent direct contact with core NATO nations on its borders.
Belarus was never a serious consideration for NATO or EU membership, but with a possible democratic transition, it became possible making a democratic transition impossible as Russia re-asserted its influence and ended its confrontation with Lukashenko. Any hope of Belarus being integrated into the European family of nations died. Instead of providing Lukashenko a dignified exit, they threatened him and Putin with another color revolution forcing each other back into each other’s arms.
The Future of Belarus and its Relationships in Europe:
Belarus is at a crossroads with very few good options and lots of bad ones. Here are the paths I see for Belarus going forward. Then I explain which ones are the most likely and why others aren’t viable.
Belarus desperate for cash seeks formal union with Russia completing the charter underpinning the Union State treaty. Putin gives Lukashenko a graceful and comfortable exit.
Belarus refuses the Union state for informal integration with expanded Russian military basing rights and special rights for Russian companies. Essentially Belarus becomes an informal colony of Russia. A country only in name only.
Belarus can continue trying to balance Russia with China by seeking BRI loans and grants. China’s distance from Belarus would soon make this nonviable as Russia asserts its local proximity. The equivelant of a corporate hostile takeover occurs and Belarus is replaced with his son or someone more amenible to Russia.
Belarus could attempt to make some concessions to the opposition and allowing Tsikhanouskaya to return and run for President in the next election. Lukashenko would let his son run in his place and rig the election to look tighter then the previous ones. Enough to please the EU but not to unlock funding. Belarus pleads for an IMF loan.
Options one and two are the most viable for Belarus to follow. It provides a military and financial umbrella for the country and established power base that Lukashenko has built around him over the past three decades.
Option one is the most likely as it gives Russia an additional buffer between its core territories plus total control of the Belarusian lands, which it can now tap fully. The Union State would incorporate Belarus as part of Russia, giving full citizenship, voting rights, and access to social services that Belarus can now ill-afford to provide to its population of 10 million people. Lukashenko, already wealthy from his time in office, would be given a cozy retirement where Russian officials can still keep an eye on him. Sochi being the likely retirement for the former Belarusian president.
Option two is less likely than one as it leaves the Belarusian establishment in place without giving them many ways to exert power. There is nothing more dangerous than an ideal group of former power brokers now cast in meaningless roles. Belarusian coffers would be infused with Russian loans, grants, and cash managed by Belarusian officials friendly to the Russian government. Eventually, a move to unite the countries will occur down the line but will be led by a forced retirement of previous Belarus officials. Some would go quietly, and others would disappear.
Options three and four are not realistic as the carrots and sticks the EU, and the US possess are severely inadequate.
Belarus doesn’t export primarily to the EU or the United States, making the sway of EU trade sanctions virtually powerless. Now banking sanctions might cause a partial decline in exports, but considering the tight linkages between Belarus and Russia, I wouldn’t be surprised to see trade become denominated in Rubles instead of dollars or euros between the two countries. Furthermore, the EU's commitment to the now exiled party heads can’t be withdrawn to attempt a reproach with Belarus. Such a withdraw of support would damage the reputation of the EU and likely not cause a change within Belarusian circles.
Conclusion: Belarus and Russia forced into a loveless marriage.